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Abstract
We build up a di¤erential game to investigate the interplay be-
tween the quality of health care and the presence of an evolving dis-
ease in a duopoly where patients are heterogeneous along the income
dimension. We prove unicity, stability and perfection of the open-loop
Nash solution. Moreover, we identify the admissible parameter region
wherein price regulation achieves the twofold objectives of ensuring
cares to all patients and eradicating the disease.
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1 Introduction
So far, the theoretical literature on the quality of health care has extensively
dwelled on the analysis of the provision of health care in the framework of
multidimensional product di¤erentiation combining vertical and horizontal
dimensions (see Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002, Beitia, 2003, Brekke et
al., 2006, Brekke et al., 2010, inter alia). However, a feature common to
all the contributions belonging to this stream of research is that patients
are supposed to be identical in their capacity of paying for medical cares,
i.e., this approach generally leaves aside the typical assumption of hedonic
tastes inherent to the analysis of quality choice in the theory of industrial
organisation, dating back to Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978).
Additionally, the provision of health care is investigated in settings where
the objective of health care, i.e., the disease, is only implicitly considered, so
that these models could be interpreted as describing, in general, di¤erentiated
industries where rms are typically subject to price regulation.
To the best of our knowledge, Brekke et al. (2010) o¤er the rst analysis
of this issue in a dynamic game setup. Here, we set out with a twofold aim:
to study the design of a health care regulation system where (i) the existence
of a disease is explicitly accounted as a dynamic process, and (ii) patients
di¤er in income and therefore also in their resulting willingness to pay for
medical treatment.
We build up a dynamic duopoly with vertical di¤erentiation where a high
and a low-quality hospital set their health care levels and the market can be
partially covered, in the sense that some individual may not receive health
care. In the model, hospitals set their quality level non cooperatively at every
instant. The demands for high and low quality di¤er depending on patients
income. Finally, we interpret price regulation in this model as a ne tuning
device whereby the public agency adjusts prices so as to attain two goals:
(a) ensure universal treatment, i.e., full market coverage, and (b) eradicate
the disease.
The open-loop information structure is investigated rst. Our results
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show that there is a unique steady state equilibrium where hospitals provide
vertically di¤erentiated services. We also single out the parametric condition
required to ensure saddle point stability. Then, we show that there exists
a unique vector of regulated prices ensuring indeed that every individual is
cared for and the disease is completely eradicated. Finally, we model the
feedback game to prove that the open-loop solution is in fact a degenerate
feedback one, and therefore it is subgame perfect.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The setup is laid
out in section 2. Section 3 describes the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Price
regulation policy is in section 4. Section 5 briey characterises the feedback
game. Concluding remarks are in section 6.
2 The model
We adopt a continuous time setup, where time is t 2 [0; T ) : We take a
nite horizon as we are interested in nding out whether the disease can
be eradicated in nite time. To investigate the optimal provision of health
services, we rely on a variant of the vertical di¤erentiation model with hedonic
preferences originally due to Mussa and Rosen (1978), where individuals are
indexed by a marginal willingness to pay for health care  2 ;  ;  > 1:1
Over such interval, the population is uniformly distributed with unit density,
so that its size is equal to one. Two hospitals serve the market, each one
being characterised by a di¤erent quality level. The instantaneous measure
of health care quality is qi (t) ; i 2 fL;Hg, which is the control variable
of hospital i. The price of quality i at any time t is constant at pi; being
regulated by the government or a public agency. For reasons that will become
clear in the remainder, we allow for pH > pL:
By accessing the high-quality health service, an individual of type  at-
1The marginal willingness to pay can be interpreted as the reciprocal of the marginal
utility of income, whereby, if the latter is decreasing,  increases in income. See, e.g.,
Tirole (1988, ch. 2).
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tains the following net instantaneous surplus:2
UH (t) =  + qH(t)  pH  D(t); (1)
where D (t)  0 measures the level or intensity of disease su¤ered by this
individual at time t. Instead, if the same individual resorts to the inferior
quality care, the resulting net surplus is:
UL (t) = k + qL (t)  pL  D(t);
where k 2 (0; 1) is a positive time-invariant parameter capturing the idea
that gross satisfaction from receiving the low quality is lower. The third and
last admissible case is that where an individual does not receive any health
care; for the sake of simplicity, we set the corresponding utility level to zero -
which does not necessarily correspond to the death of the patient. To make
sense of this normalisation, consider what follows. Parameter  measures
the individual taste for medical care in a hospital. If the patient is not
being served, one may imagine that he/she receives some form of parental
care at home, resulting in an alternative utility n (t)   D (t) ; where n (t)
measures the instantaneous amount of the (unmodelled) parental care. It
su¢ ces to assume that n (t) = D (t) at all times to economise on the number
of endogenous variables.
In line of principle, we admit the possibility that the poorest section of
the population be priced out of health cares. Accordingly, we set up the
model under partial coverage.3 In order to construct the demand functions
2This specication of the utility function is borrowed from Colombo and Lambertini
(2003).
3Although it would perhaps be natural to assume full coverage (as, e.g., in Brekke et
al., 2010), we refrain from imposing it at the outset as it would cause the disease D (t)
to disappear from the prot functions of the two hospitals. This, in turn, would trivially
imply that rms should be taxed in order to induce them to internalise this crucial aspect
of their service.
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for the high- and low-quality services, we solve the indi¤erence conditions:
UH (t) = UL (t), b (t)+qH(t) pH D(t) = kb (t)+qL (t) pL D(t); (2)
yielding b (t) = pH   qH (t)  pL + qL (t)
1  k ; (3)
and4
UL (t) = ke (t) + qL (t)  pL  D(t) = 0; (4)
yielding e (t) = qL (t)  pL  D(t)
1  k : (5)
Hence, the demand functions are:
xH (t) =    b (t) ; xL (t) = b (t)  e (t) : (6)
On the supply side, we assume hospitals to be prot-seeking units. Prices
are being regulated over the entire horizon of the game by a public agency,
whose objectives will be discussed in detail in the remainder. Hence, hospital
i controls only the quality of its services qi (t) over time. The supply of health
care entails the instantaneous cost  i (t) = cx2i (t) ; while any other costs are
assumed away. Therefore, the hospitals instantaneous prot function is:5
i (t) = [pi   cxi (t)]xi (t) : (7)
4With parental cares n (t) 6= D (t) ; the indi¤erence condition (4) would instead write
ke (t) + qL (t)  pL  D(t) = n (t) D (t) :
5We disregard the possible presence of a lump-sum transfer to hospitals, as it is alto-
gether immaterial in terms of the characterisation of equilibria and the viability of rms.
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The disease dynamics is represented by the following state equation:

D = sD (t)  v [qH (t) + qL (t)] ; (8)
where D (t) is the intensity of the disease at time t and the constant s > 0
measures the rate at which the disease intensies; parameter v > 0 measures
instead the e¤ectiveness of health care.
The maximum problem of hospital i can be formulated as follows:
max
qi(t)
Z T
0
i (t) e
 tdt;
subject to the state equation (8) and the initial condition D0 = D (0) > 0:
The discount rate  > 0 is assumed to be the same for both rms. The
relative size of  and s will play a key role in shaping our results. To this
regard, it seems natural to assume  < s in order for hospitals to attach a
proper importance to the future of patients, which additionally spills over
positively to the present value of the prot ow.6
The game is fully non cooperative, with simultaneous play at every t;
with two controls (quality levels, one for each player) and a single state (the
intensity of the disease). Hence, the relevant solution concept is the Nash
equilibrium, to be further qualied according to the nature of information
attached to it. We consider rst the open-loop information structure.
3 The open-loop game
Under open-loop information, rm i has to choose its quality level qi (t) so
as to maximise the Hamiltonian function:
Hi (t) = [pi   cxi (t)]xi (t) + i (t) [sD (t)  v (qH (t) + qL (t))] ; (9)
6This specic point is also relevant in the eld of environmental and resource economics,
where low discounting increases the welfare of future generations (see, e.g., Stern, 2007;
Nordhaus, 2007; and Weitzman, 2007).
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where i (t) is the costate variable associated with the state D (t) ; under the
initial condition D (0) = D0 > 0; and the salvage value 
i (D (t)) is set equal
to zero, for reasons that will be claried later. We are setting ourselves out
to prove:
Proposition 1 The open-loop game yields a unique steady state equilibrium
point, at
DOL =

pH (1 + k) + 2pLk   2c
 
 (1 + k)  pH   pL

v
2 (s  2v) c ;
qOLH =
pH (s  (1  k) v) + spLk   2c
 
   pH

s+
 
pH   pL    (1  k)

v

2 (s  2v) c ;
qOLL =
2cspL + s
 
pH + pL   2c

k +

pH (1  k) + 2c
 
pH   pL    (1  k)

v

2 (s  2v) c :
The condition v (1  k) > s   su¢ ces to ensure that DOL; qOLH ; qOLL 	 be a
saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. The necessary conditions are:7
@HH
@qH
=
2c

pH   pL   qH + qL    (1  k)

+ (1  k) [pH   v (1  k)H ]
(1  k)2 = 0;
(10)
@HL
@qL
=
2c [D (1  k) + k (qH   pH) + pL   qL] + k (1  k) [pL   kv (1  k)L]
k2 (1  k)2 = 0;
(11)
 @HH
@D
=

H   H ,

H = H (  s) ; (12)
 @HL
@D
=

L   L , (13)

L =
2c [qL   pL  D (1  k)  k (qH   pH)]  k (1  k) [pL   k (  s)L]
k2 (1  k)2 :
7For the sake of brevity, henceforth we will omit the explicit indication of the time
argument.
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The associated transversality conditions require i (T ) = 0:
From (10-11), we may obtain both the dynamics of controls and the ex-
pressions of the optimal costates at any time. Solving (10-11) w.r.t. controls
and di¤erentiating the resulting expressions w.r.t. time, we obtain:

qH =
2c

D   (1 + k)
 
H + k
2

L

v
2c
;

qL =
2c

D   k (1 + k)
 
H + k

L

v
2c
:
(14)
Then, solving again (10-11) w.r.t. costates, we have:
H =
(1  k) pH + 2c

pH   pL   qH + qL    (1  k)

(1  k)2 v ;
L =
k (1  k) pL + 2c [D (1  k) + k (qH   pH) + pL   qL]
k2 (1  k)2 v :
(15)
Now, plugging (12), (13) and (15) into (14), we can rewrite the control equa-
tions as follows:

qH =
1
2c
[(s  ) (pH + kpL)  kv (1  k) pL  (16)
2c
 
(s  )   + qH   pH+ (k (qH   pH) + qH + pL) v +D (  2s+ v (1  k)) ;

qL =
1
2c
[k ((s  ) (pH + pL)  v (1  k) pL)  (17)
2c
 
(s  )  k + qL   pL+ (k (qH   pH) + qH + pL) v +D (  2s+ v (1  k)) :
Imposing stationarity on the dynamic system
 
D;

qH ;

qL

; we identify the
coordinates of the unique pure-strategy open-loop Nash steady state equilib-
rium:
DOL =

pH (1 + k) + 2pLk   2c
 
 (1 + k)  pH   pL

v
2 (s  2v) c ; (18)
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qOLH =
pH (s  (1  k) v) + spLk   2c
 
   pH

s+
 
pH   pL    (1  k)

v

2 (s  2v) c ;
(19)
qOLL =
2cspL + s
 
pH + pL   2c

k +

pH (1  k) + 2c
 
pH   pL    (1  k)

v

2 (s  2v) c ;
(20)
where the superscript OL stands for open-loop. Using (18-20), it is quickly
checked that H = 

L = 0; meeting thus the transversality conditions. Equi-
librium outputs are xOLi = pi= (2c) :
In order to check stability, we have to evaluate the Jacobian matrix of
the dynamic system:
J =
266666664
@

D
@D
= s
@

D
@qH
  v @

D
@qL
  v
@

qH
@D
= 2s    v (1  k) @

qH
@qH
=   s  v (1  k) @

qH
@qL
= 0
@

qL
@D
= 2s    v (1  k) @

qL
@qH
=  v (1 + k) @

qL
@qL
=   s
377777775
;
whose eigenvalues are:
1 =   s ; 2 = s  2v ; 3 =   s+ v (1  k) : (21)
In order to ensure saddle point stability, the above eigenvalues must take
di¤erent signs. A su¢ cient condition to this purpose is indeed v (1  k) >
s ; whereby 1 < 0 for the assumption that  < s; and 3 > 0; irrespective
of the sign of 2: It is worth noting that the positivity of 3 implies that
the net growth rate of the disease must be more than o¤set by the marginal
e¤ectiveness of health cares evaluated by patients belonging to the lower
section of the income distribution.
It is worth noting that at the steady state, for a given price vector, (i) full
market coverage does not obtain in general, and (ii) the sub-population of
patients being treated become chronic, i.e., as DOL is constant but positive.
Well come back to these issues in the next section.
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An obvious complement to Proposition 1 consists in assessing the e¤ects
of variations in prices on the equilibrium quality levels qOLi .
8 The relevant
partial derivatives are
@qOLH
@pH
=
(1 + 2c) s  (1 + 2c  k) v
2 (s  2v) c ;
@qOLL
@pL
=
(2c+ k) s  2cv
2 (s  2v) c ;
(22)
implying a non-monotonicity result that we may formulate in the following:
Corollary 2 For all s > 2v; @qOLi =@pi > 0; i = H;L: The same holds for
all s 2 (0; 2cv= (2c+ k)) : Inside this range,
1. for all s 2 ((1 + 2c  k) v= (1 + 2c) ; 2v) ; @qOLi =@pi < 0; i = H;L;
2. for all s 2 (2cv= (2c+ k) ; (1 + 2c  k) v= (1 + 2c)) ; @qOLH =@pH > 0
while @qOLL =@pL < 0:
That is, in quite extreme regions where the growth rate of the disease is
either much higher or much lower than the marginal e¤ectiveness of either
medical care, each quality increases in its own price, all else equal. In the
intermediate range, as s decreases, rst we observe a negative e¤ect of price
increases on quality levels, and then a further switch in the opposite direction.
In particular, along s = v, @qOLi =@pi is negative for both rms.
Having characterised the optimal behaviour of the two rms and the
reaction of optimal qualities to any price changes, we are now in a position
to investigate the objectives of the public agency in charge of regulating
prices, and the consequent design of the related measures.
8To this regard, there exists a lively debate in the literature, with contrasting results
both on the theoretical side and on the empirical one (see, e.g., Gravelle and Masiero,
2000; Brekke et al., 2007; and Karlsson, 2007, for theoretical discussions, and Kessler and
McClennan, 2000; Tay, 2003; and Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003, for empirical ndings).
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4 Regulating prices
Given the nature of the problem at hand, we can argue that the regulator
should manipulate prices so as to achieve a twofold objective, namely, to
ensure that (i) the entire population has access to medical care (i.e., what
we usually dene as full market coverage), and (ii) the disease be completely
eradicated, at least at the steady state equilibrium. We are about to show
that there exists an admissible range for ; wherein price regulation attains
both objectives at the same time, as claimed in
Proposition 3 For all  2

2c (2c+ 1  k) + (1  k) k
2c (1 + k) + (1  k) k ;
2c+ 1 + k
1 + k

; prices
pRH =
2c

 (1 + k)  2 (c+ k)
1  k ; p
R
L =
2c

2c      1 (1 + k)
1  k ;
ensure the universality of medical cares and the eradication of the disease in
steady state.
Proof. This translates into solving the system
XOL   1 = 0;
DOL = 0;
(23)
w.r.t. pH and pL: This yields the unique pair:
pRH =
2c

 (1 + k)  2 (c+ k)
1  k ;
pRL =
2c

2c      1 (1 + k)
1  k ;
(24)
with
pRH > 08  >
2 (c+ k)
1 + k
;
pRL > 08  <
2c+ 1 + k
1 + k
;
pRH > p
R
L 8  >
4c+ 1 + 3k
2 (1 + k)
;
(25)
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which also entail xOLi > 0 and x
OL
H > x
OL
L :Moreover, it must also be true that
qOLH > q
OL
L in order to exclude the arising of a quality leapfrogging problem
in correspondence of the regulated price vector. This requires:
 >
2c (2c+ 1  k) + (1  k) k
2c (1 + k) + (1  k) k : (26)
Finally, it is easy to verify that
2c+ 1 + k
1 + k
>
2c (2c+ 1  k) + (1  k) k
2c (1 + k) + (1  k) k > max

1;
4c+ 1 + 3k
2 (1 + k)
;
2 (c+ k)
1 + k

:
(27)
5 The degenerate feedback game
It is well known that open-loop Nash equilibria are not, in general, subgame
perfect (or strongly time consistent). Judging from the shape of the demand
functions (6), the fact that xH is independent of D; while xL contains D
seemingly implies that the above open-loop solution indeed is not subgame
perfect because the state variable appears in the system of rst order con-
ditions taken on controls. We are about to prove, instead, that the present
game belongs to the class of so-called state-redundant or perfect games in
which open-loop equilibria are degenerate feedback ones.9
The Bellman equation of hospital i is:
Vi (D (t)) = max
qi(t)

i (t) +
@Vi (D (t))
@D (t)

D

; (28)
where Vi (D (t)) is rm is value function. We are going to prove the following:
Proposition 4 For any given price vector fpH ; pLg ; the game yields a unique
9See Mehlmann (1988, ch. 4) and Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 7), inter alia. Also note
that, by imposing full coverage from the outset, the game would trivially become linear in
the state variable, the latter appearing in the state equation only.
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feedback equilibrium coinciding with the open-loop one, whereby the latter is
strongly time consistent.
Proof. The rst order conditions are:10
2c

 (1  k)  pH + pL + qH   qL
  (1  k) pH   v (1  k) @VH (D)
@D

(1  k)2 = 0;
(29)
2c [k (pH   qH) D (1  k)  pL + qL]  k (1  k)

pL   vk (1  k) @VL (D)
@D

k2 (1  k)2 = 0;
(30)
from which we obtain optimal qualities
qH =
pH   2c
 
   pH  D

+ kpL   v (1  k)

@VH (D)
@D
+ k2
@VL (D)
@D

2c
;
qL =
k

pH + pL   v (1  k)

@VH (D)
@D
+ k
@VL (D)
@D

  2c  k   pL  D
2c
:
(31)
Before proceeding any further, observe that plugging the above solutions into
(6) one obtains the following expressions:
xH =
pH   @VH (D)
@D
(1  k) v
2c
;
xL =
pL   @VL (D)
@D
k (1  k) v
2c
:
(32)
Since the low-quality output is the only possible source of a quadratic term in
the entire problem, if VL (D) is linear the whole game is necessarily linear in
D as well, as there is no reason to suppose VH (D) to be quadratic. With this
in mind, we may now turn to the explicit solution of the Bellman equations,
10Henceforth, we will omit the time argument for the sake of brevity.
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that simplify as follows:
pH

2
@VH (D)
@D
(1 + k + 2c) v   pH

+
@VH (D)
@D

4kpL   (1  k)

@VH (D)
@D
(1 + 3k) + 4
@VL (D)
@D
k2

v

v 
4

@VH (D)
@D
 
sD +
 
(1 + k)    pL   2D

v
  VH (D) c = 0; (33)
for rm H; and
pL

4
@VH (D)
@D
(k + c) v   pL

+
@VL (D)
@D

2pH (1 + k)  (1  k)

2
@VH (D)
@D
(1 + k) +
@VL (D)
@D
(3 + k) k2

v

v 
4

@VL (D)
@D
 
sD +
 
(1 + k)    pH   2D

v
  VL (D) c = 0; (34)
for L: To reach a closed-form fully analytical solution, we have to conjecture
the explicit form of the value function Vi (D). On the basis of the above
considerations, we pose that Vi (D) is linear in D:
Vi (D) = "iD + i; i = H;L: (35)
Using the above functions, we may simplify the Bellman equations so as
to obtain the following system:
4Dc (  s+ 2v) "H = 0; (36)
pH [2"H (1 + k + 2c) v   pH ] + 4cH 
"H

4c
 
 (1 + k)  pL
  4kpL + v  "H (1 + 3k) + 4"Lk2 (1  k) v = 0;
(37)
for hospital H; and
4Dc (  s+ 2v) "L = 0; (38)
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pL [4"L (k + c) v   pL] + 4cL + "L [pH (1 + k) 
2c
 
 (1 + k)  pH
  v  2"H (1 + k) + "L (3 + k) k2 (1  k) v = 0; (39)
for L. Hence, it appears that our conjecture concerning the linearity of
the value functions was indeed correct.11 The above equations are to be
solved w.r.t. the unknown parameters appearing in the rmsvalue functions
f"H ; "L; H ; Lg :
From (36) and (38), one immediately obtains "H = "L = 0, which means
that the two rmsvalue functions are indeed constants, i.e., Vi (D) = i.
Then, solving (37) and (39), we have:
H =
p2H
4c
; L =
p2L
4c
: (40)
Of course, the expressions appearing in (40) measure the discounted prot
ows, as the feedback equilibrium prots accruing to rm i are Fi = i:
There remains to impose stationarity on the state dynamics, whereby

D = 0 delivers:
DF =

pH (1 + k) + 2pLk   2c
 
 (1 + k)  pH   pL

v
2 (s  2v) c : (41)
From (31), the equilibrium qualities are:
qFH =
pH (s  (1  k) v) + spLk   2c
 
   pH

s+
 
pH   pL    (1  k)

v

2 (s  2v) c ;
qFL =
2cspL + s
 
pH + pL   2c

k +

pH (1  k) + 2c
 
pH   pL    (1  k)

v

2 (s  2v) c ;
(42)
while from (6) we obtain the equilibrium output levels xFi = pi= (2c) ; i =
H;L; respectively. Hence, XF = xFH + x
F
L = (pH + pL) = (2c) :
This proves indeed that the open-loop equilibrium is subgame perfect,
11We have also checked the alternative possibility where the value function of i is
Vi (D) = iD
2 + "iD + i; nding that i = 0; so that the linear form obtains.
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and also implies that the regulatory measures outlined in the previous sec-
tion trivially extend to the feedback game. And there is more to it. As
prices appear in the rmsrst order conditions, endogenising price regu-
lation would require solving a Stackelberg game with the regulator in the
leaders position. This would automatically imply the Stackelberg open-loop
solution to be time inconsistent, as the interplay between prices and qualities
involves that the game is controllable by the leader.12 One can tackle this
problem by modelling a nondegenerate feedback Stackelberg solution where
the leaders controls are taken to be state dependent in a linear way (see
Dockner et al., 2000, pp. 134-135):
pH = a+ bD; pL = w + zD; (43)
where fa; b; w; zg is a vector of real numbers, and the regulators problem
consists in determining this vector for its own purposes. Given that the
objective of the regulator is to achieve D = 0 and X = 1; (43) reduces to
pL = a; pH = w; where it su¢ ces to set
a = pRH =
2c

 (1 + k)  2 (c+ k)
1  k ;
w = pRL =
2c

2c      1 (1 + k)
1  k ;
(44)
to attain the same price regulation policy already characterised in the open-
loop game, the value of both b and z being altogether immaterial.
6 Concluding remarks
We have modelled the interplay between vertical di¤erentiation and the en-
dogenous evolution of a disease in a dynamic duopoly with heterogenous
patients. In addition to the unicity, stability and subgame perfection of the
12For the concept of controllability in Stackelberg di¤erential games, see Xie (1997) and
Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 5).
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open-loop Nash equilibrium, our analysis yields a clearcut message as to the
design of the price regulation policy, as there exists a parameter range wherein
price regulation simultaneously delivers two eggs in one basket, namely, uni-
versal service and the eradication of disease.
17
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